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Abstract 
This paper talks about ways in which infrastructure for biomedical data-intensive 
discovery is operationalized. Specifically, it is interested in information security 
solutions and how the processes of scientific research through data-intensive 
infrastructures are shaped by them. The implications of information security for big 
data biomedical research have not been discussed in depth by the extant IS literature. 
Yet, information security might exert a strong influence on the processes and outcomes 
of data sharing efforts. In this research-in-progress paper I present a developing, in-
depth study of a leading information linkage infrastructure that is representative of the 
kind of opportunities that big data technologies are occasioning in the medical field. 
This research calls for IS to extend the discussion to consider, building on the empirical 
detail of intensive case studies, a whole range of relations between provisions for 
information security and the processes of scientific research and data work.  
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Introduction 
This paper talks about ways in which infrastructure for biomedical data-intensive ‘discovery’ is 
operationalized in big data research infrastructures. Specifically, it is interested in information security 
solutions and how the processes of scientific research through research infrastructures are shaped by 
them.  
The implications of information security for data-intensive biomedical research have not been discussed 
in depth by the extant IS literature. Discussions of the consequences of norms and regulations for 
accessing data in medical journals and reports have mostly been concerned with highlighting that while 
protection of individuals must be guaranteed, complex ethics review processes make research more 
difficult (Dove et al. 2016) – as researchers need to involve in lengthy negotiations for accessing less data 
than they ideally would. This research includes these concerns but calls for IS to extend the discussion to 
consider, building on the empirical detail of intensive case studies, a whole range of relations between 
provisions for information security and the processes of scientific research and data work.  
This must not be narrowly understood as a range of relations that is contained within the boundaries of a 
single organization, as in the split between production and support functions that characterizes much of 
the literature on security and work process. Not only the operational boundaries but also the institutional 
reference points of an organization have become blurred as a result of the great reconfiguring of relations 
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that networking technologies and data-intensive work have occasioned. On this backdrop, this paper 
supports the view that in order to develop systems that allow data-intensive biomedical research to 
happen, technical and governance controls must be continuously related with external stakeholders 
representative of the wider society here involved (Burton et al. 2015). 
The research-in-progress I am presenting here intends to address a gap in our understanding of the 
implications of information security by trying to link information security requirements and solutions 
with the shape that opportunities for medical discovery take in new, cutting edge data sharing 
infrastructures. I present a developing, in-depth study of a leading information linkage infrastructure 
that is representative of the kind of opportunities that big data technologies are occasioning in the medical 
field. This kind of infrastructures collect data that have been generated by a number of institutions in a 
specific territory as routine task in the context of health, social and mental care service delivery (these 
include but are not limited to, for instance, data from GP –general practitioner– practices or hospitals). 
These datasets are linked at individual level, anonymized, in order to construct the possibility of 
longitudinal studies that follow individuals between institutions and facilities, over time, and throughout 
the course of their health life. 
In the research I intend to show how, in different ways across different contexts, the flows and life-cycles 
of data and the directions in which research process consequently develops are shaped by governance 
panels, access rules and enforcing technologies. The argument is of interest to the information systems 
community, which holds a deontological commitment in linking practices and technologies to their 
societal and organizational consequences. It contributes to an understanding of the conditions that make 
data-intensive science through big data technology possible or impossible. 
In this paper, I argue that the role of information security in data-intensive science has been left 
undetected. Yet, I argue, information security might exert a strong influence on the processes and 
outcomes of data sharing efforts. Expectations on the re-use of scientific data, as raised by arguments 
highlighting the opportunities of open data and big data infrastructures, and reified by the funding that is 
dedicated to these initiatives, rely on the hope of multiplying scientific investigations with the re-used 
data. By and large the idea is that purposefully developed infrastructures are important to allow multiple 
actors to look at datasets with new eyes. The opportunity to explore data is deemed important for 
generating new insights. 
However, socio-technical environments engineered to control and govern the access to these resources 
through a mixture of response and preventive technologies (Baskerville et al. 2014) and procedures could 
well shape the trajectory of research processes and projects. And yet, security solutions and architectures 
are related to a fast-changing environment through the hazards that it presents (Baskerville et al. 2014), 
but also to the requirements that it formulates. Information security practice is embedded in the material, 
organizational, social and regulatory landscapes of research: requirements are deeply context-dependent. 
Data infrastructures for biomedical research in particular face very tight requirements on data handling, 
storage, access and re-use.  
Privacy is paramount in medical research and the embedment of its definition at the heart of society 
sometimes has been ignored by researchers and infrastructure developers alike – at their own peril. The 
debacle of the “care.data” initiative and infrastructure in the UK is one of the most recent and a very 
illustrious example of how a technical infrastructure fails when its definition, discussion and development 
happen in neglect of its relations to the wide and complex of society (Ward 2015). For a long time, since 
well before the development of the data-intensive infrastructures here discussed in this paper, the 
protection of patient privacy and questions of public good have been an ineludible pre-condition for 
research in biomedicine involving human subjects (directly or indirectly). Yet and importantly, the 
mutable definitions of these continuously constructed concepts necessitate an exercise in reflexivity to be 
situated at the heart of each infrastructure project, to consider emerging risks, and which needs to be 
repeated in the face of changing environmental conditions (Ciborra 2007).  
How information security requirements are defined depends among other factors on the disciplinary, 
legal, ethical, political and business context in which the infrastructure is situated. Developing 
infrastructures in a sensitive, contended and competitive ground like that of biomedical research 
demands the implementation of complex solutions. Whether data consigned to databases are accessible 
and useable depends partly on the strategies employed by database developers and curators to keep data 
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alive as potential evidence and valuable commodities. The data that these infrastructures host must be 
maintained and made available in ways that are useful for researchers and potentially productive of new 
knowledge, while at the same time the infrastructure must protect itself and the stakeholders from 
unwanted consequences (for instance unauthorized disclosure, and individual re-identification).  
On this backdrop, I argue that there is a need for understanding about what these requirements mean in 
the development of data-intensive research systems and their eventual implications for science practice. 
For instance, information security solutions aiming at protecting patient confidentiality can require 
information suppression at several stages of the data journey process: how could this shape the trajectory 
of a research project and its end outcomes? These are the kinds of questions that I set out to investigate in 
this research project. To investigate the implications of information security on the organization of the 
research process (Lowry et al. 2015), we must document the pipeline of data sharing, collecting 
information about all the different steps involved in making re-use of data in research possible (Leonelli 
2014). As Nissenbaum argued, a fine-grained study of systems is fundamental to understand the social 
dimensions of new technology (Nissenbaum 2001).  
Information Security and Data-Intensive Work 
Literature on information security in information systems has not yet been concerned with the question of 
the role of information security functions in big data or data-intensive science infrastructures. Still, the 
literature employs a number of concepts that can be helpful as analytical lens to guide this investigation, 
however, it is not straightforward how to inform this case. Periodically, reviews of the extant literature 
have lamented how the security field has remained theoretically underdeveloped, mostly concerned with 
sharing anecdotal evidence and recommendations in which social and management issues are discussed 
in negligible proportions (Siponen et al. 2008). Most security development methods have long been 
largely unable to thoroughly factor in the unique social and human factors that characterize every 
organization and its work processes (Siponen 2005). Unfortunately, translating insight from anecdotal 
recommendations to new analytical work is difficult when the phenomenon of investigation is an 
innovative and complex infrastructural arrangement. 
Despite these critiques, the one conceptual framework that has remarkably shaped practice and research 
is the “golden security triangle” of CIA (Shameli-Sendi et al. 2016:23) that divides risks of attacks to data 
assets between, namely, Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (Gold 2010; Nissenbaum 2005). 1 
Security incidents affect confidentiality when protected information is disclosed to unauthorized parties, 
integrity when data and software are corrupted and original information is compromised, availability 
when information is made inaccessible due to system shut down or service disablement. 
Information security risk assessment approaches (Shameli-Sendi et al. 2016) help us to understand that 
health datasets held by an information link data infrastructure are critical targets, which can be targeted 
by attacks, with potential long-term consequences. Surely, linked health data are valuable because they 
can be linked to other data to produce new information. Also, they are sensitive because they can be used 
for the re-identification of vulnerable and unaware individuals. As a result, the legal, social and normative 
pressure on health data infrastructures is extremely high. Here, risk means more than losing control of a 
valuable asset after data breach and disclosure. Risk of a security accident can impact the organization at 
different levels of abstraction (asset, service, and business), and when there are dependencies with other 
resources at the same or different levels, risk propagates in complex ways (Shameli-Sendi et al. 2016), 
potentially endangering the enterprise. 
Once data are held, they can be put to use in multiple ways and for a potentially long time. The social and 
organizational costs of a consistent data breach of linked health datasets could be very high. As Graves 
and colleagues highlight (Graves et al. 2016), costs to be accounted for a data breach are not only direct 
ones but also the indirect ones. In a data infrastructure for biomedical data linkage research, indirect 
costs could include to make future data sharing more difficult both for the affected infrastructure and for 
other infrastructures. The existence of large stolen datasets would increase the risk of linkage with other 
datasets at the attacker’s disposal, increasing the incentive for further attacks in turn. The impact on 
                                                
1 It must be said that there have been proposals for modifications and extensions to the CIA triad of 
categories, but it remains out of the scope of this paper to discuss them. 
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public confidence could mean tighter regulations, and fewer participation in research studies due to 
increased privacy concerns. As Durante explains (Durante 2011), the definition of privacy is not about the 
control over specific data assets, but rather in the right to participate in the construction of one’s life self-
narrative. As such the potential damage to the right to privacy from re-identification of linked, 
longitudinal health data profiles is extremely high, as linked datasets are multi-dimensional and 
comprehensive. 
To contribute to the uncertainty as to what measures are appropriate to the risks involved in developing a 
data sharing infrastructure, the ethical challenges implied by data sharing and linkage are the object of an 
open discussion. 2  Several years after Nissenbaum’s argument on the convergence of computer and 
national security (Nissenbaum 2005), there is little clarity as to how we should consider risks involving 
publicly-funded research infrastructures (Stahl et al. 2012), which one might argue sit both at the critical 
infrastructure level and at the level of the single organization concerned with protecting from attacks and 
related (consequential) liabilities. 
In addition, the NHS in UK is still a main target of security breaches, with implementation of information 
security policies an open problem that can be affected by both insufficient level of guidance by 
management concerned with discharging responsibilities (Stahl et al. 2012), and lack of care and skill by 
employees that operate data in NHS institutions (Gold 2010). All these circumstances suggest that 
mapping the ramifications of risk is a very complex and uncertain undertaking and might be mobilized in 
favor of highly-protective approaches to security of an infrastructure, which could come to rely on an 
array of “hard trust” technical solutions at the expense of “soft trust” based on social relations (Patrick et 
al. 2005). 
Flipping the “Golden Triangle of Security”  
According to Stahl and colleagues, we do not know enough on the organizational role of information 
security policies and arrangements (Stahl et al. 2012). As such, it becomes interesting to ask how does 
information security in a high-risk setting such as a health data infrastructure impact its core function, 
that of enabling scientific research. Scientific research can easily be understood as a kind of work process 
that is difficult to pin down to a model and a list of requirements. 
A main concern for researchers of usable security is that security should not involve trade-offs that 
negatively shape work processes in the organization. When security makes work more complex, people 
prioritize execution over security. Designing systems that are psychologically acceptable requires 
designing for the expectations of those who will use the system (Bishop 2005; Sasse and Flechais 2005). 
This in a data infrastructure might be particularly difficult since end users are health researchers, who are 
often distributed both geographically and institutionally. Most often they have no training in using 
security technology, and it can be easy for developers to assume sophisticated user understanding of 
information sharing (Good and Krekelberg 2003). Despite health researchers are consistently reminded 
of the risks involved in handling human subject data, lack of knowledge about users makes it difficult to 
trust them and design the most usable technology (Adams and Sasse 1999). Also, security is usually 
understood as a supporting task (Sasse and Flechais 2005) and not a production task, and this separation 
might perhaps contribute to make it difficult to consider its role in shaping data-work processes, as it is 
not seen as a defining element of work. Unmotivated users, abstract policies and lack of user feedback 
                                                
2 For instance, Aicardi and colleagues argue that “changing practices in the collection and use of digital 
data require a revised framework and nomenclature regarding the norms, rules, and principles governing 
biomedical research” (Aicardi et al. 2016:209-210) and indicate five open challenges: 1) the concept of 
“personal data” is changing, as data about an individual can be personal for more than one person; 2) it is 
not possible to guarantee definitive anonymization in practice; 3) it is impossible to anticipate all future 
uses of the data, therefore informed consent is at issue; 4) a much broader spectrum of datasets can be 
put to health-relevant use (think search engine queries) than those collected by accordingly regulated 
institutions; 5) there are limited options to rectify consequences of inferencing errors at a time when 
predictive analytics are gaining momentum. As the authors suggest, these challenges are open to 
discussion and are an opportunity for all affected parties to make a contribution towards solutions. 
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united with the criticality of potential breaches and the vulnerability of any network from its weakest link 
are all factors that conjure up against design of technology with ideal usability (Whitten and Tygar 1999). 
While the usability literature helps to understand how security can be perceived as an obstacle, I am 
interested in understanding in what ways compliance can shape the supported research work process. If a 
support function interferes with a production function in an infrastructure, this is important. This is 
particularly sensitive in data-intensive work such as research in big data infrastructures, I argue, as work 
processes are deeply involved in manipulating the very same resource that information security 
requirements might need to be as controlled as possible. The distinction between supporting and 
production task, in this light, tends to blur. Designing enabling information security becomes of 
paramount importance for research infrastructures that are aimed at maximizing re-use of the data. Even 
when implemented information security can be unquestionable given legal, social and ethical 
circumstances, it is important to understand if it has implications. Still, understanding the costs of 
information security is not an easy task also because it is difficult to estimate the opportunity cost of 
missed research partnerships. But I have tried to argue, to this point, that it is still worth asking the 
question.  
On this backdrop, in this research I try to operate a “gestalt switch” and “flip” the CIA framework to 
include not only external risk factors such as attacks and theft, but also and most importantly internal 
ones, including information security itself and its solutions. Processes that are internal to the secure 
infrastructure might stand in an ambivalent relationship with the research process itself and its potential 
to detect and track the phenomena of interest –scientific research is very susceptible of the specific 
material arrangements in which it is carried out.  
Methodology 
The research builds on an ethnographic study of a data linkage infrastructure in the biomedical research 
domain that is based in the UK: the Secure Anonymised Information Link (SAIL). SAIL is a databank 
developed to make possible the re-use for health research purposes both of routine data generated 
through public services and of otherwise unavailable datasets generated in the context of individual 
scientific projects. The publicly-funded infrastructure was developed within the Health Informatics 
Research Unit at the University of Swansea in Wales to build a world-class health research facility for 
research communities both locally and globally, aiming at re-purposing biomedical datasets through their 
integration in a dedicated digital infrastructure. Given the amount of sensitive information involved in 
such an enterprise, SAIL needs to address concerns around data privacy, and both the public good and 
potential harm that such an infrastructure can generate. 
I have argued in the introduction that in order to be able to study the data re-use pipeline it is necessary to 
collect information about all the steps involved in the “data journey” (Leonelli 2016; Leonelli 2014). The 
focus of the research is not “simply” to situate a data-intensive research infrastructure in the wider 
context and discuss how the environment offers opportunities and exercises pressures on the 
infrastructure, as from an external point of view. Instead, it is about tracing in detail how these conditions 
shape the data management and research processes (and outcomes) that the infrastructure aims to 
enable. As such, current conceptualizations of data re-use journeys such as, for instance, digital data 
streams (Piccoli and Pigni 2013) are not well developed in this respect. The focus should not be whether 
an infrastructure is an aggregator, a creator, or else, of data. Rather, it should be to look at all the steps of 
data work and understand their implications for final outcomes (Tempini 2015). It is about a different 
way to attend to value creation, at the level of actual data practices. This level of detail is crucial to be able 
to make empirically-informed claims about scientific practice and its knowledge creation regimes. 
To this end, I have conducted more than 20 interviews with relevant SAIL members at all levels, covering 
scientific, technical and support development tasks. Crucially, I have also interviewed researchers external 
to the organization who have used SAIL for research purposes, i.e. the end users. Interviews are semi-
structured, following an itemized interview-guide that is custom to every interviewee (Flick 2006). Data 
collection includes as well internal documentation, presentations, and observations collected in SAIL 
analyst meetings. The topic of information security and its impact in the research process emerged very 
early in the interview process and was since integrated as a main topic. The data collection phase is 
continuing. Only a small portion of interviews has so far been analyzed with a first coding pass, to review 
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progress, identify emerging themes for analysis, and select topics for further investigation in interviews. 
What follows is not a complete analysis of the data thus collected. Instead, I offer in the form of a short 
empirical narrative a review of the areas of investigation that I have been concerned with in respect to 
information security and research processes. 
First observations: governing inferences, shaping information flows 
SAIL is a databank developed to make possible the re-use for research purposes of routine data generated 
through public services but also datasets generated in the context of a scientific project. Here, researchers 
need to satisfy demanding criteria in order to access and use the data, and publish the findings. 
Monitoring and reviewing processes bring the research project to run along a well-established path. 
Research questions are discussed and reviewed before the application and the actual start of a research 
project. At the same time, the staff operating the infrastructure needs to satisfy also other demanding 
criteria to guarantee the security of the research environment, and technology is deployed in order to 
constrain human agency and ensure compliant behavior. 
A considerable and, for research purposes very important, proportion of the data handled by SAIL is 
collected by GP practices, where practitioners are invested with the duty of managing and protecting 
patient records. When discussing their role in transferring such data to a centralized infrastructure, 
database managers describe their duties as “data custodian” or “guardian”, with responsibilities to 
guarantee the security of the research environment. In fulfilling the role of data guardians, SAIL staff are 
faced with a variety of requirements that need to be satisfied for the infrastructure to attract researchers 
and dispel risks and polemics.  
Information security concerns are paramount and determine the specific solutions adopted to safeguard 
data access and use. In a stark contrast with bird-eye views (and claims) for big data research to have no 
constraints of scope nor scale, these concerns continuously shape choices about the tools, the time and the 
data that are provided to researchers in the context of each project. To this aim research activity with 
SAIL data is confined to a carefully designed virtual research environment: access is strictly regulated 
(with automated access restriction to specific users, at specific times of access, and to specific data 
resources), user behavior is automatically monitored and can be audited at any time, and functionality 
which constitutes an unacceptable information security risk (most importantly, the unauthorized 
exportation of data) is restricted. All data are anonymized through a complex split-file approach, to 
guarantee that no party holds access to the entirety of the linked information. 
In combination with cutting-edge information technology solutions, security of the research projects is 
ensured through a (more traditional) review process of project applications involving external 
stakeholders, and the following negotiation of an economic set of data variables that is deemed to be 
sufficient to carry out the project and which will be made available in the research environment. In line 
with other databases storing sensitive datasets, the review panel members need to investigate and 
evaluate the motivations, methodologies and aims of their users against the crucial dimensions of 
feasibility and risk. Applicant researchers, review panel members and SAIL analysts are routinely 
involved in a step-wise triangulation process where the understanding on one hand of what is feasible 
from a research point of view, given the available data sources, and on the other hand of what is sensible 
and secure research, is constructed each time through a highly contextual process. Information security 
requirements are deeply situated and localized in each project, and defined as much by the nature of the 
data types and phenomena in question, as by the disciplinary, legal, ethical, political and business context 
in which the infrastructure is situated. 
Crucially, these security arrangements are intended to shape information flows, to selectively govern the 
possibilities for inferencing about individual health records. On the one hand much security is dictated by 
the need to reduce to the minimum the risk of deductive disclosure (the risk of disclosing protected 
information –i.e. individual identity– as a result of linking together datasets). One the other hand, the 
infrastructure is shaped and designed to enable as much as possible very different kinds of inferences 
from the data, such as those investigating relationships within individual health histories.  
Importantly, at the aggregate level decisions about individual projects, and the experience of the 
collaborations that further unfold, can have deep effects, reaching far beyond the individual project. SAIL 
is a full-fledged research infrastructure that has evolved over time through negotiations that interface the 
 Science Through the “Golden Security Triangle” 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 7 
requests advanced by researchers seeking to create new knowledge and the concerns, conventions and 
regulations that require the research projects to be transparent and accountable. The complex solutions 
that have evolved over time are the result of this repeated interfacing. They are continuously re-assessed 
and modified for the improvement of one or another aspect, and are at the same time the basis for 
incremental improvement and path-dependent infrastructural inertia. 
Concluding observations: for the security of security solutions 
Achieving information security is broadly defined as a matter of triangulating accessibility (usable and 
practical access to resources), confidentiality (protection of sensitive information) and integrity (data 
fidelity is ensured) against the social context in which an infrastructure is situated. When analyzing the 
SAIL material, it appears that information security is not only concerned with risk from unauthorized 
action from 3rd parties. In consideration of the sources of potential loss of productive function, this 
research opens up the question as to whether requirements towards three CIA dimensions sometimes 
work at cross-purposes – for instance, we might ask if confidentiality provisions might reduce themselves 
the accessibility of data assets. If datasets are an asset that must be protected, to be employed in services 
for data re-use, then information security investigations can concern processes both inside vs outside the 
organization as well as compliant vs non-compliant. If we define risk as “the exposure to any proposition 
which involves uncertainty” (Holton in Shameli-Sendi et al. 2016:16), risk might be inherent to certain 
kinds of operations with data that pertain to secure data management and infrastructure development. 
Eventual operations of data management that might turn a dataset unable to be put to work for the 
production of new information become of concern under this extended analytical lens. A certain form of 
risk recursivity seems to be possible: that an information security solution at an asset level might become 
a source of risk for running a service or the business level. Source of risk interact if they require 
countermeasures that work at cross-purposes. 
In consideration of the evidence thus far collected and reflected upon, I believe it is necessary to further 
open up a discussion about how information security requirements and solutions shape the trajectories 
and outcomes of efforts for data sharing for research. This is a momentous opportunity for IS scholarship 
to make a broad contribution as, in the time of Big Data, initiatives are multiplying that seek to link health 
datasets with one another and with datasets originated in diverse settings such as administrative or the 
natural sciences. IS scholarship needs to engage to understand the conditions that shape the journeys of 
data. 
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